After the removal of Otto von Bismarck from the chancellorship of the German Empire in 1890, the network of alliances he had formed on the Old Continent began to disintegrate. It was a multipolar system, in which a multitude of powerful states and interests neutralized each other, creating a fragile balance. At the height of the Bismarckian system, in 1887, Germany was bound by various agreements with all the continental powers of Europe.
As the Prussian chancellor himself stated in 1877, the goal of the system was the marginalization of France and the emergence of Germany as a dominant power in Europe. By forming the Triple Alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy (1882) and signing the bilateral Reinsurance Treaty with Russia (1887), Bismarck ensured that France would remain marginalized in Europe, unable to form an anti-German coalition. Furthermore, Berlin was indirectly linked to London through the Triple Alliance following the conclusion of the Mediterranean Pact in 1887 between the United Kingdom, Italy and Austria-Hungary.
Italy was the weakest link in the chain that connected the forces of the Triple Alliance. It had signed the founding of the Alliance in 1882 and renewed its membership in 1891, 1902 and 1912. However, public opinion seemed divided over Italy’s relations with Austria-Hungary. On the one hand, liberal and nationalist Italians favored a confrontation with Austria over the South Tyrol region and the eastern shores of the Adriatic. On the other hand, Catholic and conservative groups applauded the policy of rapprochement with Vienna. Therefore, Italy pursued a policy that was complex and contradictory.
In 1898, France set in motion a process of rapprochement with Italy, in which Théophile Delcassé and Emilio Visconti Venosta, foreign ministers of France and Italy respectively, and the French ambassador in Rome Camille Barrère played the leading roles. The two sides signed secret agreements in 1900 and 1902, which largely canceled Italy’s obligations to the other two powers of the Triple Alliance. According to the agreement of 1902, Italy was bound to maintain a neutral attitude in the event of the outbreak of a Franco-German war. This development, of course, which was kept secret until 1915, when Italy entered the war, created problems for Germany’s strategic planning, which was based on the splitting of French forces into two fronts.
When war broke out in the summer of 1914, Berlin and Vienna expected Italy to take a clear position on their side as a result of its commitments to the Triple Alliance. Italy, however, declared its neutrality on July 31. In October of that year, Prime Minister Antonio Salandra characterized Italy’s policy as “sacro egoismo” (sacred egoism), aiming to make his country a truly powerful and great power. In the following period, both the Central Powers and the Entente claimed Italy’s membership in their coalitions, each side offering its own lure. The alliance of the British, French and Russians ultimately emerged victorious from this competition.
Italy joined the London Pact on April 26, 1915, and almost a month later, on May 23, declared war on Austria-Hungary, but not on Germany. The fears of several Austrian officials, who had proposed a pre-emptive strike against Italy, knowing its expansionist ambitions in Austrian lands, were thus confirmed. According to Austrian Chief of Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf, Italy was “a snake whose head was not crushed in time”.
Column editor: Myrto Katsigera, Vassilis Minakakis, Antigoni-Despina Poimenidou, Athanasios Syroplakis